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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
Afghanistan is a mountainous and ethnically diverse country where successive national governments
have failed to exert effective authority over the country’s varied regions. The 1979 Soviet invasion
led Muslim and Western governments to channel support to mujahedeen forces, igniting a civil war
which, essentially, continues today. The conflicts have led to extensive contamination by landmines
and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Following the 1989 departure of Soviet forces, the international community initiated support for
what has come to be called the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). The organisations
comprising the MAPA have been largely successful, both individually and collectively, and the overall
programme has evolved through a number of stages:
 Tentative beginnings (1988‐90) – the initial, failed efforts by the UN and (more successfully)
international NGOs to initiate mine action activities
 Establishment and expansion (1990‐96) – the creation of the first Afghan Mine Action “NGOs”
and the build‐up of both the NGOs and the programme coordination mechanism in Islamabad
 Relocating to Afghanistan (1996‐2002) – the long process of relocating programme planning and
management functions from Pakistan to Afghanistan, which led to a Mine Action Coordination
Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) based in Kabul, but dominated by international personnel
 MAPA in the post‐Taliban era (2002‐2007) – a second expansion in the size of the programme
plus the beginnings of engagement with legitimate national authorities
With the submission of Afghanistan’s Article 5 Extension Request, the MAPA now seems to be
approaching the end of its latest phase; one characterised by (i) a tighter focus on medium‐term
performance targets, (ii) another burst of growth, (iii) a progressive shift to the nationalisation of the
MACCA’s management team and (iv) more concerted efforts to initiate a transition to national
ownership.

Faltering first steps
Compared to other first‐generation mine action programmes, from almost the start, Afghans have
featured prominently in senior management functions. In particular, a number of the Afghan mine
action NGOs grew into large and capable demining operators. They were coordinated by a fairly
small, UN‐managed MAC that – due to the insecurity throughout Afghanistan – remained based in
Islamabad.
This changed dramatically following the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001. MACCA relocated to
Kabul with a significantly expanded complement of international personnel, which served to
marginalise the many capable Afghans working in the MACCA. Given this, it is unsurprising that the
MACCA’s first vision for transition adhered to the conventional wisdom at the time within the
international mine action community: an inter‐ministerial committee serving as national authority,
reporting to a vice president, under which would be the national Mine Action Centre (MAC). The
MACCA envisaged that it would subsequently transition to a nationally‐managed MAC.
With this vision for the NMAA and MAC in mind, in 2004 the UNDP and MACCA launched a mine
action transition project that aimed to reverse the setback in nationalisation and accelerate the
transfer of ownership from the UN to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). However, the project
ended prematurely in late 2006 after the UNDP advisor concluded the pre‐conditions for a
successful transition were absent. Most fundamentally, the Government had never expressed
interest in assuming responsibility for mine action; as well, the participating UN agencies did not
reach an agreement on a transition plan, which prevented constructive engagement with the GoA.
ii

Subsequently, the draft legislation to create a national mine action programme was abandoned, due
in part to opposition of the Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), a government unit established
in 1990 which had been largely ignored. That opposition from such a weak source could block the
legislation suggests there was no champion for transition within the government and no group, such
as the Afghan mine action NGOs, pressing the government to make a commitment to transition.

Nationalisation without ownership
Taking a different approach, a new MACCA management team – headed for the 1st time by an
Afghan – convened a ‘national mine action symposium’ in December 2007. This led to a meeting of
an ‘inter‐ministerial body’ (IMB) and, eventually, to the designation that DMC would remain the
‘government focal point’ for mine action. However, this was an ad hoc initiative and the decision
that DMC would serve as focal point could not be interpreted as a GoA commitment to strengthen
DMC and prepare for transition. Regardless, the decision represented a consensus among key
ministries and, shortly afterwards, the MACCA offered to have DMC collocate within the its
compound. MACCA initiated a number of activities aimed at developing DMC capacities for
coordination of demining and of mine action overall.
This was consistent with a new approach to transition in which the MACCA worked to enhance the
capacity of existing organisations. This had begun with agreements in 2007 for MACCA support to:
 The ministries of Education and Public Health, together with the Afghan Red Crescent
Society, for MRE
 The ministries of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled, Education, and Public
Health for Victim Assistance
MACCA also published transition objectives in its annual plan for 2009‐10, including a 2013 target
date for transition, and reported progress in subsequence annual plans.
Some progress was indeed achieved. But DMC and the Afghan ministries remained dependent on
the expertise and financing provided by MACCA. More troubling, the GoA made no effort to
strengthen DMC or to enhance its negligible status (e.g. DMC had no input into or control of its
budget, and did not even have a stamp, which prevented it from sending official communications to
other government units). At the same time, key donors and UNMAS headquarters have not engaged
the Government on the issue of transition. As a result, when it came time to prepare Afghanistan’s
Article 5 Extension Request for submission in March 2012, the burden fell entirely to the MACCA.
The Extension Request does sketch out a possible path to transition, but at the time of writing there
has been no signal from the GoA how it intends to proceed.
On the other hand, UNMAS was able to fully nationalise the management structure in MACCA, with
the few remaining international staff reverting to advisory roles. This was a significant achievement
– where international technical assistance personnel actually did achieve the oft stated goal of
‘putting themselves out of a job’ – and it demonstrates confidence in the capability of Afghan mine
action managers to run a large and complex programme. But it does not constitute transition to
national ownership; for this, the GoA must show willingness to accept ultimate responsibility and to
discuss how to transfer responsibility, which has not happened.

iii

INTRODUCTION
Key features of the history, society, and economy
At 647,500 km2 (about 50% larger than Iraq), Afghanistan is a mountainous and ethnically diverse
country. The largest ethnic group among the estimated 29 million people is Pashtun, followed in size
by Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. The country’s borders cut through the traditional homelands of many
ethnic groups, leaving Pashtun divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Tajik and Uzbek
Afghans split from those in the Central Asian republics. This has complicated efforts by successive
national governments to exert authority over the country’s diverse regions, which remains a
recurrent theme in the political economy of the country.
These difficulties have been magnified by interference from neighbouring countries, often facilitated
by the cross‐border ethnic and religious affiliations, which also bolster informal trade (i.e. smuggling)
and further reinforce regional divisions. Prolonged conflict has also seen the growth of war
economies, especially opium, which provide revenues and regional power bases for insurgents and
the many warlords (or, more politely, “commanders”).
The 1979 Soviet invasion led Muslim and Western governments to channel support to mujahedeen
forces, igniting a civil war. Fierce resistance wore down the Soviets forces, who exited in 1989. The
mujahedeen finally toppled the pro‐Soviet regime headed by Najibullah in 1992 but then continued
fighting among themselves. While a government of sorts was formed, it remained under constant
attack by other factions, reducing much of Kabul to ruins. The anarchy only ended with the Taliban
movement, which took Kandahar (late 1994), Herat (1995) and Kabul (1996). Some anti‐Taliban
forces then united under the Northern Alliance, controlling about 20% of the country. The conflict
continued until late 2001 when the U.S.‐led coalition threw its weight behind the Northern Alliance.
By December 2001, their forces captured Kabul and the Afghanistan Interim Authority was installed.
However, the Taliban were not destroyed. Initially, much of the effort to eliminate the Taliban was
left in the hands of regional “commanders” financed by the U.S. This proved unsuccessful and
alienated the population.1 The Taliban resumed operations in Afghanistan starting in early 2003 and
regained control over large areas, leading to renewed conflict. Because of this, security remains the
central issue in Afghanistan. It is a pre‐condition for revitalising the legitimate economy and for the
government to establish even minimal credibility. Progress on the peace‐building agenda requires
wholesale reform of the country’s security sector, demobilisation of multiple militias and the
destruction of vast quantities of arms.
In this difficult environment, international efforts to foster a legitimate government have largely
floundered. After being anointed by Western powers as head of the Interim Authority in 2001,
Hamid Karzai has been declared the victor in two presidential elections, in spite of widespread
allegations of rigged voting. His government is widely viewed as both ineffective and corrupt.
Regardless, in 2009 the government initiated peace talks with some elements of the Taliban.
Progress on this front was set‐back seriously with the assignation of the chief government peace
negotiator, Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011.

The Contamination Problem
Explosives contamination in Afghanistan stems from:
1

See for example, “…regions that show up as “Low Risk...on United Nations security maps are areas where
local populations often report high levels of conflict and are experiencing insecurity at the hands of armed
political groups, warlords, commanders and their associates.” Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004,
Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002‐2003, Tufts University, p 7.
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The Soviet intervention – 1979‐89
The campaigns by the mujahedeen against the Najibullah regime – 1989‐92
The civil war among various mujahedeen factions – 1992‐95
The civil war between mujahedeen factions and the Taliban – 1995‐2001
The U.S.‐led coalition campaign to overthrow the Taliban – 2001
Continued conflict between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), coupled with
the Afghan National Army, against the Taliban and other insurgency groups.

No one has been able to provide a definitive assessment of the contamination problem, for a
number of reasons:
 The Afghanistan programme began when “humanitarian” demining2 was an emerging
discipline, with limited capacity to conduct systematic surveys
 Mine action personnel have not had secure access to the entire country
 Significant contamination stems from mines scattered from the air by the Soviets, and is in
remote, inaccessible locations
 The absence of a functioning government in much of the country means there is no simple
channel to report contamination to authorities
 Continued fighting has led to new contamination.
A reasonably thorough picture of the contamination was provided by the Afghan Landmine Impact
Survey (ALIS), completed in late 2004. It reduced the total suspected hazardous area (SHA)
remaining from about 850 km2 to 715 km2 (14%). However, the discovery of new contamination3
plus slow updating of records led the remaining SHA figure to creep‐up again, reaching a maximum
of 852 km2 in 2007. It has since fallen slowly due to record clean‐up and more rapid release of SHA
through enhanced survey and better information management, as well as clearance.
Figure 1 – the evolving contamination picture: area of unresolved SHA
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The ALIS also provided a new way of assessing the impact of contamination in Afghanistan. As with
LIS conducted in other countries, it focussed more on communities than on individual hazards,
finding that 2,368 communities (8% of the national total) – home to 4.2 million people (15% of

2

In mine action, ‘humanitarian’ usually means simply ‘non‐military’ and not for a commercial purpose. Thus,
humanitarian mine action may support broader humanitarian, reconstruction, peace‐building, and
development programmes.
3
Since the completion of the ALIS, 3,285 hazards have been added, including 1,224 minefields totalling 67 sq.
km. See Table 48 on page 157 of the Article 5 Extension request.
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Afghanistan’s population) – were impacted by explosives contamination. Almost 2,500 recent
victims (i.e. within the two previous years) were identified.

HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME FOR AFGHANISTAN
The evolution of MAPA can be divided into a number of phases:
 Tentative beginnings (1988‐90) – the initial, failed efforts by the UN and (more successfully)
international NGOs to initiate mine action activities
 Establishment and expansion (1990‐96) – the creation of the first Afghan Mine Action “NGOs”
and the build‐up of both the NGOs and the programme coordination mechanism in Islamabad
 Relocating to Afghanistan (1996‐2002) – the long process of relocating programme planning and
management functions from Pakistan to Afghanistan
 MAPA in the post‐Taliban era (2002‐2007) – a second expansion in the size of the programme
plus the beginnings of engagement with legitimate national authorities
The MAPA has now entered a new phase characterised by (i) a tighter focus on medium‐term
performance targets, (ii) another burst of growth, and (iii) more concerted efforts to initiate a
transition to national ownership.

Tentative beginnings: 1988‐90
The signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988 led to optimistic predictions of impending peace and the
repatriation of millions of refugees, but it was apparent that landmines were a major impediment. In
July 1988, HALO Trust started a small programme in Kabul. Shortly thereafter, the UN commenced
its mine action activities by (i) funding MRE for refugees, and (ii) using Western military personnel to
train thousands of refugees in basic clearance techniques. This UN effort was an abject failure, which
pointed to the need for a different approach.4

Establishment & Expansion: 1990‐95
Switching strategy, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to
Afghanistan (UNOCHA) then decided to encourage the establishment of what have become known
as the Afghan Mine Action NGOs (although in fact these were established in Pakistan under special
registration provisions for Afghan “NGOs”5).6 Most international donors channelled funding via the
UN to finance the Afghan mine action NGOs, giving the Mine Action Coordination Centre for
Afghanistan (MACCA7) great leverage.
HALO Trust aside, the programme functioned more like an industrial conglomerate than a network
of independent organisations. In essence, the MACCA served as the corporate headquarters, with
the operators functioning like divisions that had to operate within the corporate strategy and

4

See Florence, Colonel Brian and Jim Freedman, 1991, Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme in
Afghanistan, available at http://www.gichd.org/lima/reports‐publications/detail/publications/evaluation‐of‐
the‐mine‐clearance‐programme‐in‐afghanistan/
5
These organisations were formed as delivery mechanisms for the UN and lack both the governance structures
and independence that most knowledgeable people would expect of an NGO.
6
The first of these – Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) – was created as a clearance organisation in October
1989, followed by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), which specialised in minefield survey and data
base management. The Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan
Rehabilitation (OMAR), and the Mine Dog and Detection Centre (MDC) followed in subsequent years.
Additional partners were added over time, most of which were involved in MRE.
7
From 1989‐2008 it was called the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA). MACCA has never been
a legal entity; rather, it is a UN project (currently, an UNMAS project executed by UNOPS).
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operations plan, but each with some independence in how they achieved the objectives set for
them. The annual operations plans were prepared collectively.
MACCA’s leverage – and its ability to institute this ‘conglomerate model’ – was based on more than
its control over much of the funding. None of the Afghan NGOs could operate with full
independence even at the individual task level. For example, a demining task might entail a survey
by MCPA (which had all the survey capacity), followed by a task order by MACCA to an operator with
clearance assets (ATC, DAFA or OMAR), with META providing QA inspections. MDC supplied dog
teams – it did not have the capacity to undertake survey or clearance on its own. MCPA would
record all data. The model was successful in many ways and the programme expanded rapidly.

Relocating to Afghanistan: 1995‐2002
In the anarchy following the Soviet withdrawal, the MACCA was based in Islamabad. It had only five
international personnel supported by a few local staff. However, because of the excellent
relationships between MACCA and the Afghan NGOs, buttressed by UN control of the finances, this
small unit was able to coordinate the programme. However, as different regions of the country
evolved on diverse trajectories, the separation of MACCA and NGO headquarters in Pakistan from
the work in Afghanistan became increasingly problematic. Once security improved with the
emergence of the Taliban in 1994, the NGOs opened offices in Afghanistan. UNOCHA then
established Area Mine Action Centres (AMAC) in the country. From the start these were managed by
Afghans – the first management positions in the MACCA occupied by Afghans.
The MAPA operated more or less effectively during the 1996‐2002 period. MAPA partners were able
to operate in areas under both Taliban and Northern Alliance control, and mine action was widely
recognised as one of the most effective aid programmes in the country.8 Regardless, donor
governments appeared to lose patience with Mine Action. Instead of providing a solution (i.e. once
the mines are cleared the problem is resolved), Mine Action in Afghanistan came to look like a
never‐ending proposition. New landmines were being laid by both the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance. Even without the new minefields, MAPA partners kept finding more contamination than
they were clearing. As well, the MACCA management team failed to deliver a credible strategic
plan.9 In 2001, mine action funding plummeted in both absolute terms (to just over $13 million in
2001 from an average of $20 million in the three previous years) and, even more so, as a percentage
of all aid to Afghanistan (to 3.8% compared to an average of 13% in the three previous years).
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Figure 2 – International aid to Afghanistan and the MAPA: 1997‐2000
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8

See, for example, van Ree et al (2001), Report on the Review of UNOCHA’s Mine Action Programme for
Afghanistan, for CIDA, Japan and ODA (U.K.).
9
In lieu of a Strategy, the MACCA management team compiled a Powerpoint presentation.
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It is unclear whether the decline in Mine Action funding would have continued because the attack on
the World Trade Center of 11 September 2001 led to dramatic changes in both Afghanistan and the
international engagement in the country. Within a year, MACCA had relocated to Kabul and come
under the responsibility of UNMAS, and the Mine Action programme was growing rapidly.

MAPA in the post‐Taliban Period: 2002‐07
After the World Trade Centre bombings on 11 September 2001, the Northern Alliance – backed by
the U.S.‐led coalition – breached Taliban lines and quickly took control of the entire country. The
MAPA partners lost much of their equipment in the conflict. They quickly had to resume operations
and undertake a rapid assessment of the new hazards stemming from coalition bombing. Clearance
priorities also needed to be altered to deal with cluster bomb strikes and to address the return of
displaced persons to their homes. The MRE programme had to be overhauled, with women
instructors re‐engaged and programmes established for refugee camps and transit centres. Large‐
scale reconstruction projects, particularly roads and airports, also required demining support.
The installation of the interim government meant the end of the UNOCHA mandate. The UN
transferred MACCA to UNMAS and moved it from Islamabad to Kabul, just as hundreds of other
agencies were establishing offices in the capital. New staff had to be added to handle the
administrative, finance, and logistics functions previously provided by UNOCHA in Islamabad. The
number of international positions more than tripled to over 20. MACCA and its implementing
partners responded effectively to the challenges, and donors increased funding almost fivefold. In
2003, Afghanistan became a State Party to the Anti‐Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
Given the large number of returnees and the substantial requirements for demining support to
reconstruction projects, mine action was seen by donors as a key sector. The Mine Action
Consultative Group (MACG – a government‐donor mechanism designed to enhance aid
effectiveness) was formed in the same year under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MoFA). Mine action also featured in both the Afghan Compact, agreed in London in February
2006, and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) adopted in 2008.
The targets set in the Afghan Compact and ANDS envisaged that, by 1 March 2013 (Afghanistan’s
Article 5 deadline), SHA recorded at the time (the ‘baseline’ of 720 km2) would be demined.
However, SHA continued to be discovered, so the ANDS noted that “A capacity to remove mines and
ERWs beyond the 2013 MAPA transition deadline probably will be needed.” (p. 55)
Table 1 – Afghan Compact and ANDS Targets for Mine Action
Target
Indicator & status
All stockpiled anti‐personnel
 In October 2007, the GoA
mines will be located and
announced the achievement of the
destroyed by 20 March 2008
Ottawa Treaty obligation to destroy
all known stockpiles.
The area contaminated by
mines and unexploded
ordnance will be reduced by
70% by the end of 2010
Clear 90% of all known SHA
by 1391 (2012)
Clear all emplaced anti‐
personnel mines by 1391 (1
March 2013) as per the
Ottawa Convention.

 Square meters of land released as
safe.
 The baseline is 720 million m2 of
suspected hazardous areas (SHA),
implying:
o 540 million m2 need to be
released by the end of 2010
o 648 million m2 by the end of
2012
o 720 million m2 by 1 March 2013






Comments
Over 480,000 anti‐
personnel landmines have
been destroyed.
Some stockpiles may not
have been located
On target relative to the
baseline, however…
New SHA continue to be
discovered.
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MAPA since 2007
The increase in the roster of international personnel in the MACCA after 2002 enabled the rapid
rebuilding, then expansion, of capacities. However, productivity drifted downwards (see Figure 3 –
Demining Outputs) and the MAPA was seen as resistant to the adoption of techniques pioneered
elsewhere. In addition, the increase in numbers of international personnel meant some crowding‐
out of capable national managers. No Afghan managers occupied high profile positions. At one point
a position of Deputy Director was established and reserved for an Afghan national, but never filled.
Finally, in mid‐2007 UNMAS created a new management structure at the MACCA and appointed Dr
Haider Reza – the first chair of the MACG, who was widely viewed as effective – as Programme
Director. Shortly after, another Afghan was appointed Operations Manager. The new management
team instituted a number of reforms to operations and broader programme management.10
Table 2 – MAPA Reforms

Broad reforms

Operations reforms

 Enhanced information management
 Revised criteria for priorities
o Criteria for resource allocation
o Criteria for task priorities
 Regionalisation of Afghan demining NGOs
 New ‘business model’ based on contracting

 ‘Full‐service’ Afghan demining NGOs
 Enhanced survey processes
o Landmine Impact Assessment Teams
o Polygon survey
 One‐man lanes
 Smaller demining teams

These led to substantial improvements in the key outputs delivered from the demining programme.
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Figure 3 – Demining Outputs
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In turn, these improvements bolstered donor confidence and led to another expansion in funding.11

10

See Paterson et al (2008), Assessment of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), GICHD,
www.gichd.org/links‐information‐database/research‐and‐evaluation‐
reports/country/linksdb/countries/afghanistan/
11
For an assessment at the time, see Paul Davies and Bruce Todd (2010), Mid‐Term Evaluation of the Mine
Action Programme in Afghanistan, HTSPE Limited for EU, available at http://www.gichd.org/links‐information‐
database/research‐and‐evaluation‐reports/country/linksdb/countries/afghanistan/
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Figure 4 – Estimated international funding to MAPA 1989‐201012
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The Graph does not include financing for commercial operators, estimated at $85 million in 2010.
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GOVERNMENT AND DONOR ENGAGEMENT IN MINE ACTION
Afghanistan has been a fragile state for decades. The international community is insufficiently
equipped, coordinated, and coherent13 to achieve success in the complex task of developing a
nation, and success ultimately depends on the emergence of a reasonably capable and committed
national government. But a transition from dependency on international actors to national
ownership is fraught with problems due to real differences in strategic approach that inevitably will
emerge, plus the fact that the state apparatus has limited capacity to plan and implement a multi‐
dimensional development effort.
Most donors want transition in principle, but they may believe the government lacks the capacity or
commitment to manage a sector. Transferring authority to national officials means donors face
fiduciary and ‘reputational’ risks that some of their funds may be stolen or wasted.14 As well, in
insecure countries such as Afghanistan, donors have trouble attracting and retaining personnel who
are sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced to manage risks effectively (i.e. who could
determine when accepting risk is a worthwhile gamble and when it is not). As a result, donors
generally avoid risks, hampering the transition to national ownership.
This has been the case in Afghanistan for most of the period since the mine action programme
began. While large amounts have been spent on capacity building, ill‐coordinated donor assistance
has created a fragmented “second civil service” – an estimated 7,000 Afghan consultants managing
projects – without building sufficient government capacity and, perhaps, even reducing existing
capacity.15 Given this, transition in mine action needs to be seen as part of the broader transition to
national ownership and the evolving relationship between the government and the international
community.

The Government’s Role in Mine Action
From the Soviet time, limited survey and clearance operations were undertaken by the army. In
1988 the Najibullah Government established the National Commission for Mine/ERW Clearance
under the leadership of the Prime Minister. This Commission included representatives from 15
ministries, including the Ministry of Defence.
The Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) was established via an executive decree in 1990 as the
Coordination and Secretariat Centre of the National Commission.16 Originally, it was purely military.
When the Najibullah government fell in 1992, the National Commission was dismissed, but DMC was
converted into a civilian agency and appended to the Disaster Preparedness Department (which
later became the Afghan Natural Disaster Management Authority – ANDMA17). It has remained in
existence ever since, although with scant resources and modest capacity until MACCA began to
provide greater support, starting in 2008.
13

‘Coherence’ usually refers to how well the 3Ds – the defence, diplomacy, and development arms of each
government – work together on a complex problem.
14
See OECD, Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success? 2011
15
The embassies, aid agencies, consulting firms and international NGOs hired many of the most capable
Afghan public servants, in many cases destroying capacity faster than it could be developed. The same
happened with the Afghan NGO sector, which resulted in the bankruptcy of a number of the largest NGOs,
including AREA, which had developed the initial community‐based demining projects in Afghanistan.
16
Decree No 1‐ 1969 dated 15 January 1990.
17
ANDMA itself serves as secretariat to the National Commission for Disaster Management, comprising
representatives from about 20 ministries, headed by the President. ANDMA has approximately 170 employees
and its budget of $1.5 million is barely sufficient to cover personnel costs. (Afghanistan Strategic National
Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, March 2011)
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International Mine Action Support Prior to 2002
Prior to 2002, international support was channelled directly to international NGOs or through
UNOCHA. In turn, most of the UNOCHA funds were passed‐on to the Afghan mine action NGOs. This
made the MACCA appear cost effective because a large share of total funds seemingly went to
operations rather than coordination. Part of this was slight‐of‐hand as the MACCA had created
specialised Afghan NGOs to deliver services normally discharged by a mine action centre, such as
maintenance of the national database (done by MCPA) and quality assurance and control
inspections (done initially by MCPA, then by META). Regardless, this strategy allowed the MACCA to
operate with few international personnel. With the Afghan NGOs and the AMACs in Afghan hands, a
large number of capable Afghans had the opportunity to develop technical expertise and
management experience.18

Government‐Donor Coordination Since 2002
Overall coordination mechanisms
Seeking to avoid some of the confusion created by the rush of donors into a fragile situation, the
World Bank pushed for a comprehensive aid coordination mechanism in Afghanistan, and tried to
align this with the government’s priorities and ways of doing business. The mechanism went through
a number of modifications over the years. A simplified structure was agreed at the London
Conference in early 2006, the same time as the Afghan Compact (see Figure 5).
This featured eight Consultative Groups (CG), each with a number of Working Groups reporting to it,
along with two ‘umbrella CGs’ and another five covering cross‐cutting issues, all reporting to the
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The JCMB, comprising seven GoA and 21
international members, was the senior body for policy dialogue and joint problem solving, serving as
the ‘custodian of the Afghan Compact’.
Figure 5 – Consultative Group Structure 2006‐mid 2008
Joint Coordination &
Monitoring Board (JCMB)

CG 1
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CG 2

CG 3

CG 4

WG 1
Defence

Oversight
Committee

JCMB Secretariat

CG 5

CG 6

CG 7

CG 8

25 other working groups

WG 2
Mine Action
WG 3
Police

Umbrella CGs (Poverty
Reduction; Aid

Cross-cutting CGs – Gender; Counter Narcotics; Environment;
Anti-corruption; Regional cooperation

WG 4 DIAG

18

A number of Afghan nationals from mine action have subsequently embarked on international careers.
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At the Paris Conference in July 2008, the GoA and its international partners agreed to keep the JCMB
but to streamline the rest of the structure as follows:19
Table 3 – New aid coordination mechanisms
Level
Body
Roles
1
JCMB
 main forum for joint policy formulation, problem solving and strategic
coordination
 ensure donor funds spent efficiently & in coordinated fashion
 promote mutual accountability
 ensure strategic priorities are set & adjusted with changing context
2
Standing
 one Committee per pillar:
Committees
o Security (includes mine action)
o Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights
o Economic & Social Development
3
Task Forces
 set‐up by Steering Committees to focus on specific priorities
 time‐bound
 prepare policy papers & recommendations for Steering Committees

In advance of the Tokyo conference in July 2012, the GoA also formulated 22 ‘National Priority
Programmes’ (NPPs) within six ‘clusters’, and asked donors to use these as a framework for their
assistance programmes.20 The Security Cluster
included one NPP – the Afghan Peace and
Reintegration Program (APRP) – that
incorporates some mine action projects. Mine
action also was identified as a cross cutting
issue in the Government’s “Towards Self
Reliance” paper presented in Tokyo, but it is
not mentioned explicitly in any of the NPPs.
However some kind of mine action response
will be required to support a number of NPPs
(e.g. rural road access programme; extractive
industry programme) and DMC/MACCA’s
work is relevant to the NPP covering the
rights of people with disability and
governance strengthening.

Coordination for Mine Action
For some time in the post‐Taliban period, donor coordination via the Mine Action Consultative
Group (MACG – later renamed the Mine Action Working Group) was relatively effective. The
departure of the first MACG Chair (Dr Reza) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coupled with the
rotation of key aid agency staff from Kabul, led to a decline in the effectiveness of donor
coordination, as well as coordination between the government and donors. In recent years, a
limited number of donors attend (somewhat sporadically) the monthly Stakeholders Meeting
chaired by MACCA, which is also draws UNMAS, all MAPA operators and DMC.

19

JCMB co‐chairs, Report on the Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact (for The International
Conference In Support Of Afghanistan, Paris, 12 June 2008).
20
See http://mof.gov.af/en/page/3976
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STEPS TOWARDS TRANSITION
Nationalisation without ownership
Afghanistan’s mine action programme represents a unique case in many ways, and demonstrates
the critical influence of the broader political and economic context on a mine action programme. For
example, the fact that the UN operated from Pakistan prior to 2002 led to the decision to create the
Afghan Mine Action NGOs to conduct operations inside Afghanistan. The opportunity provided by
generous funding and significant autonomy allowed these NGOs to develop a cadre of capable
managers and to demonstrate a track record of success that was sufficient to convince some donors
to fund them directly. As a result, there was a significant degree of nationalisation of management
functions (one vital aspect of local ownership) from the early days of mine action in Afghanistan. The
graduation of some of these capable Afghan managers into important positions within the
international mine action field ensured there was continued support for this ‘Afghan model’.
At the same time, no progress was made prior to 2002 on engaging with the government and
building its commitment to assume ownership for the simple reason that there was no recognised
and credible government in place. This lack of progress prevailed in the years immediately following
the expulsion of the Taliban: for example, MACCA showed no interest in building the capacity of the
DMC. Instead, it formulated draft legislation that reflected the prevailing consensus among the UN
and the main mine action donors: a new, semi‐autonomous statutory body should serve as the
national mine action centre and secretariat to the national authority (an inter‐ministerial
committee reporting to the Office of the President).21
The relocation of MACCA to Kabul also represented a temporary setback for the nationalisation of
programme management. The influx of international mine action personnel to Kabul reduced the
management scope of senior Afghans. Additional opportunities for talented Afghans only appeared
with the decision to appoint Dr Reza as the MACCA Director in 2007, marking the start of an effort
by UNMAS to nationalise the management of MACCA.

UNDP Mine Action Transition Project
The UNDP (which has the lead role within the UN mine action system for capacity development) had
not been involved with the Afghan programme prior to the instalment of the Karzai regime.
Following a 2003 assessment of transition options,22 UNDP launched a ‘mine action transition
project’ in 2004 that aimed to reverse the setback in nationalisation and accelerate the transfer of
ownership from the UN to the GoA. The first transition advisor was unsuccessful and departed early.
UNDP persevered and engaged an experienced capacity development specialist, who began in June
2005. UNDP and MACCA established a Mine Action Transition Coordination Office that same month.
However, the UNDP advisor concluded the pre‐conditions for a successful transition were absent. In
particular: Transition and handing over can only be successful on the condition that the Government
formally and clearly expresses its wish to take over the full ownership and responsibility for the Mine
Action Programme and takes the active lead in the transition process…[but]…there is still no formal
request from the GoA to hand over the MA programme and organization from the UN to the
Government.23

21

This is similar to the structure of the mine action programmes in Cambodia and Lao PDR.
Phil Bean, Mine Action in Afghanistan: Transition Options, March 2003.
23
UNDP delayed and later abandoned plans to fill two other positions (Coordinator and Transition Advisor, and
Transition Monitoring Officer) due to a perceived lack of commitment to the transitions process by the GoA.
22
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The UNDP advisor also expressed regret that A lack of agreement and competition between the UN
agencies has seriously delayed a constructive and pro‐active role towards GoA.24 As a result, the
advisor recommended the early termination of the project, which the UNDP did in December 2006.
Following this experience, the UNDP also decided to avoid any further involvement in mine action.
There appear to have been many reasons for the lack of progress. First, the mine action programme
was working comparatively well: why fix it if it’s not broken? Second, mine action was well down the
list of Government priorities. Third, demining support was essential for many reconstruction
projects: why take the risk of instituting major changes when demining disruptions could create
major problems for high‐profile infrastructure problems? On the government side, there was no
consensus concerning which ministry should take the lead role in mine action. Finally, the UN chose
to ignore DMC rather than work with it to identify a transition strategy that DMC would support.25
This is not to say there were no individuals within the government who supported the concept of
transition. In April 2005, Dr Reza, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and chair of the Mine
Action CG, did endorse a national mine action strategy (Mine Action in Afghanistan: The Way Ahead)
on behalf of the GoA. In addition to presenting ‘end goals’ for demining, MRE, stockpile destruction,
mine/ERW survivor assistance, and advocacy and coordination (see Annex 2), the strategy spoke
extensively on transition. For example, one of the key ‘influencing factors’ was “The draft
Afghanistan Mine Action Law calls for the creation of a National Mine Action Agency (NMAA). The
intended outcome of the planned Transition Process is that the full ownership, responsibility and
liability of the UN managed MAPA is transferred to the GoA.” (p. 7) However, this endorsement did
not lead to commitment on the part of the Government as a whole.
The draft mine action legislation was never presented to Parliament, due in part to the opposition of
the DMC. That opposition from such a weak source could block the legislation suggests there was no
champion within the government, or among the Afghan mine action NGOs (which are respected and
potentially influential organisations within the country), for a transition to national ownership. This
may have been due to the concern that some donors would use transition as an excuse to reduce
their financial support to mine action.

Re‐starting the Process
Soon after Dr Reza was appointed as Director of the MACCA in mid‐2007, the new management
team initiated informal discussions within the GoA to seek a clear decision concerning the body that
should be the ‘government focal point’ for mine action. These efforts led to national mine action
symposium in December 2007 involving government ministries, donors, implementing partners, UN
agencies, etc. The participants decided an inter‐ministerial body (IMB) should be established and, in
January 2008, the IMB selected the DMC as its Chair and the lead government agency for mine
action. However, the IMB represented an ad hoc initiative, never endorsed by the President or
Cabinet, and its designation of DMC as the focal point could not be interpreted as GoA policy or its
commitment to strengthen DMC and prepare for transition.
Regardless, the IMB agreed a target for transition in 2013:26 until then the United Nations, national
and international NGOs and commercial companies would support the GoA to clear all known mined

24

Gielissen, Hubert, Capacity Development for the Transition of Mine Action: Final Report, 24 Dec 2006
This may have been the correct strategy as there was no certainty the DMC would have supported realistic
solutions. As well, a joint effort by the UN and DMC to accelerate transition may have led to in‐fighting among
ministries (e.g., Defence; Interior; Foreign Affairs) to control mine action.
26
This coincided with Afghanistan’s APMBC deadline for clearance of all known mined areas.
25
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areas and carrying out MRE and VA and other mine action activities, including coordination. As a first
step towards transition, the UN refurbished offices to allow DMC to collocate with MACCA.27

The Emergence of a Transition Plan
As agreed, DMC was collocated within the MACCA compound in Kabul in 2008. From April 2009,
MACCA began listing specific transition goals as part of the annual plan for the Mine Action
programme (termed the Integrated Operational Plan – IOP). The IOP 1388 (2009‐10)28 laid‐out a
multi‐year plan for transition in some detail.
In broad terms, the plan envisaged transition when the Afghanistan Compact benchmark was met
(i.e. 70% reduction of the hazard) and that not all government end goals for mine action (i.e. those
stated in the endorsed strategy, The Way Ahead) would have be met. Further, the Transition Plan
assumes that significant international funding would continue for mine action, and for further
support to DMC, until the point where only ‘residual contamination’ is left. Thus, DMC needed the
capacity to coordinate an adequate response to this residual contamination.
The overall approach to transition envisaged three processes covering (i) overall coordination and
planning of mine action (by DMC), (ii) victim/disability assistance, and (iii) MRE, each with some
specific planned outcomes:29
1. Transition of overall Mine Action Coordination and Planning
 Outcome 1 – MACCA and its Government partners create and implement a comprehensive
transition plan that increases Government capacity
 Outcome 2 – DMC develops a capacity development plan
2. Transition of Victim/Disability Assistance and advocacy responsibility to the ministries of Public
Health (MoPH), Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), and Education (MoE)
 Outcome 1 – Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan linked to ANDS and implementation
on‐going within relevant ministries and through relevant stakeholders
 Outcome 2 – MoPH integrates disability services into both the basic and essential packages
of health services30 and develops Community Based Rehabilitation strategy
 Outcome 3 – MoLSAMD advocates for rights and services, monitors progress and raises
awareness with regards to the rights and needs of persons with disabilities
 Outcome 4 – MoE capacity to implement inclusive education within public school systems
and special needs education is standardized
 Outcome 5 – Special projects for disability advocacy and awareness training implemented to
support the efforts of the MoPH, MoE and MoLSAMD with other relevant stakeholders
3. Transition Mine Risk Education (MRE) activities to national ownership within the MoE

27

It seems the MACCA management team did not push for more at this time. On the one hand, it appeared to
fear that either the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior would try to assume control of the mine
action programme; on the other, the team was afraid that the international community and the UN would use
transition as a convenient excuse to reduce funding to mine action in Afghanistan.
28
This started with the IOP for 1388 (i.e. April 2009‐March 2010 – Afghanistan uses the Persian calendar. To
convert, add 621 after 31 March or 622 years, before 1 April).
29
The IOP 1388 also laid‐out a number of concrete outputs to be delivered. See Annex 3 for the outputs and
achievements since 1388.
30
As has been done in other conflict‐affected countries, the MoPH has focussed its limited resources on policy
and monitoring, leaving service delivery largely to NGOs and private clinics/hospitals. The Essential and Basic
health packages represent key policy decisions. Essential health packages are intended to be a guaranteed
minimum of services and aim to concentrate resources on interventions which provide the best 'value for
money'. Afghanistan’s Essential Package of Hospital Services covers provincial and specialist hospitals and is
complemented by the Basic Package of Health Services covering clinics and district hospitals.
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Outcome 1 – Mine Risk Education will be implemented within MoE structures of textbook
curriculum, child protection programme and teacher training
Outcome 2 – MACCA role of support to coordination for MRE transferred to DMC

The set of objectives outlined in the Transitions Plan is interested: it makes clear that MACCA wished
to separate responsibility for demining, Victim Assistance and MRE among different government
agencies rather have an ‘integrated’ mine action programme (i.e. one embracing all five mine action
pillars) following transition.31 For Victim Assistance, MACCA’s approach was in keeping with current
views within the international donor and ‘expert’ communities: while the APMBC and CCM create
specific responsibilities for a State Party with respect to mine and cluster munitions victims, services
to landmine and cluster munitions victims should be part of a national disability programme rather
than the responsibility of the Mine Action programme.32
There is less of a consensus within the mine action community how MRE should be organised for the
long‐term. Cost and sustainability considerations suggest that most MRE services should be
mainstreamed within ministries of Education (to reach children), but some rapid response capacity is
also required to reach specific communities following accidents, reports of new contamination, etc.
As well, in Afghanistan not all children attend school. So there remains an issue about who should
coordinate MRE: both the ‘systematic’ MRE delivered by MoE and responsive MRE. The MACCA plan
suggests this coordination responsibility should fall to MoE, with ‘support’ from DMC.33 However, it
is far from clear that MoE had the willingness to perform such a role or had the mandate and
capacity to coordinate responsive MRE, which is delivered, in the main, by the Afghan Red Crescent
Society (ARCS) and NGOs.
More fundamentally, the Transition Plan did not address the core problem identified by the UNDP
Capacity Development advisor: the seeming lack of interest at senior government levels in assuming
responsibility for mine action.
Attempts to implement the Transition Plan have proceeded along four different, albeit interwoven,
tracks in an effort to:
1. Formulate and implement a capacity development plan by DMC to put it in a position to
assume responsibility of overall coordination of mine action
2. Build capacities of the MoPH, MoE and MoLSAMD
3. Build capacities in MoE to assume responsibility for MRE (with support from DMC)
4. Prepare and implement a Transition Plan endorsed by UNMAS headquarters, that would
include both:
o restructuring MACCA to separate out those functions that would be retained by the
UN and, therefore, not transferred to DMC
o capacity development support to the various Afghan agencies that would assume
responsibilities in the transition process
We discuss these tracks in turn.
31

In some documents, MACCA also alluded to the possibility that the responsibility for managing the mine
action information system might also be transferred to a government agency other than DMC.
32
See, for example, paragraphs 13 and 14 in the Cartagena Action Plan.
33
Two large evaluations happened to take place in 2008‐09, and both considered the question of transition
strategy. The two evaluation teams came to different conclusions about whether mine action should remain
an ‘integrated’ programme or not after transition. Paterson et al, 2008, Afghanistan Country Mission Report
Evaluation of EC‐Funded Mine Action http://www.gichd.org/strategic‐management/quality‐management‐
monitoring‐and‐evaluation/evaluations/evaluations‐of‐ec‐funded‐mine‐action‐programmes/ ; Davies, Paul and
Bruce Todd, 2009, Mid‐Term Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan op. cit.
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Support for Capacity Development Planning and Implementation in DMC
A key issue in this ambitious transition plan was that the relevant Afghan agencies (DMC, MoPH,
MoE and MoLSAMID) lacked capacity and, perhaps, willingness to prepare themselves to assume
their envisaged responsibilities. Accordingly, MACCA assigned experts to work within the different
Afghan agencies. MACCA’s efforts to prepare for the transition of MRE and Victim Assistance began
first. Its strategy for the transition of these components of mine action has been different than the
approach used in most countries, and is somewhat controversial. This is discussed in a later section.
For DMC, MACCA recruited a national Capacity Support Project Manager in mid‐2009 to work on a
full‐time basis and assist DMC in formulating its own plan for transition (i.e. developing its capacities
to assume responsibility for the functions it would inherit). The individual facilitated a joint review
of DMC roles, responsibilities and structures.34 The review described the roles and responsibilities of
11 positions (plus two drivers and a cleaner), and suggested an additional four positions were
required (those shown with no shading in Figure 6 – DMC Organisation Chart, below).
Following this, MACCA proposed a ‘Partnership Framework’ to the DMC35 and the Capacity Support
Manager initiated a staff capacity and training needs assessment.36 This led to a draft Capacity
Development Plan, consisting mainly of training requirements for the incumbent personnel.
Figure 6 – DMC Organisation Chart
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The training package included:
 Foundation workshop
o Basic skills (communication, time management, effective meetings, etc.)
o Overview of management functions
 English language
34

Habib Khan, Report on Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) Current Functional Position, Jan 2010.
See Status of Core Functions for DMC/MACCA Partnership Framework: 1389, May 2010
36
Afghan Institute of Management, Training and Enhancement of Indigenous Capacities (AIMTEIC), Capacity
Development plan (CDP) for the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) Government of Afghanistan, July 2010
35
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Basic computer training
Professional training modules
o Senior management workshop
o Quality Management
o Info Management; Planning; Mechanical; EOD; etc.

MACCA then began to offer some of the basic training courses, including for English language and
basic computer usage. All DMC staff also received on‐the‐job training from their MACCA
counterparts (see Table 4 – DMC/MACCA counterparts). DMC personnel also were included in:
 Outreach to government ministries – from 2009, MACCA began to invest more effort in
establishing links with government agencies and programmes (e.g. the National Solidarity
Programme), in large part to ensure it understood their priorities for mine action support so
these could be factored into operations plans37
 An exchange programme with ANAMA in Azerbaijan (part of an aid package from Azerbaijan
to Afghanistan)
 Evaluating Mine Action training workshops – a series of three workshops delivered by the
GICHD on behalf of MACCA
 Participation in pilot projects, including the 1st and 2nd Landmines and Livelihoods Surveys in
Afghanistan (a partnership between GICHD, MACCA, DMC, the Afghan Institute for Rural
Development – AIRD, five of the IPs and, for the 2nd survey, Central Statistics Office – CSO)38
MACCA also provided financial and logistical support, plus training and advice, to allow DMC to
conduct the first annual ‘audit’ of clearance tasks in 1389. DMC conducted field audits of 10% of all
clearance tasks, plus a desk audit of another 20%.39
Table 4 – DMC/MACCA counterparts
DMC Position
DMC Director
Chief of Quality Management and Deputy Director
Chief of Operations
Planning Manager
Standards Manager
Database Manager
Assessment and Evaluation Manager
Manual Operation Manager
Mechanical Operation Manager
EOD operation Manager
MRE Manager

MACCA Department/section
MACCA Director
Overview with all departments – Operations,
Information Management, Programme
Operations Department
Plans Section
Quality Management Section
Information Management Section
Quality Management Section
Operations Section
Operations Section
Operations Section
MRE and Victim Assistance (VA) sections

MACCA, ANDMA and DMC also raised the need for a government compound for the national mine
action programme, plus the housing for the regional operations planning and monitoring function,
currently handled by the AMACs, in ANDMA or other government facilities. Suitable land for an
office compound was identified in Kabul in 2010 but, since then, no further progress has been made.
37

This has proved to be an extremely important initiative. For example, the recent Article 5 Extension Request
mentions 43 important development projects planned in Afghanistan that will require some mine action
support, including a railway line, three main dam projects, and several road networks.
38
See www.gichd.org/strategic‐management/mine‐action‐security‐and‐development/themes/socio‐
economic‐survey/landmines‐and‐livelihoods
39
The audit demonstrated that communities are satisfied with the work of demining teams. However, it also
indicated that AMAC and IP coordination with local authorities should be improved, and that communities
advocated for complete clearance of communities rather than a focus on individual high‐impact minefields.
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In short, MACCA invested heavily in clarifying the responsibilities that DMC would inherit, defining
the capacities required to discharge those responsibilities, identifying capacity gaps, and building or
acquiring those capacities. Progress, however, has been slow. The constraints include:







Inadequate legal basis for DMC – no national mine action legislation yet exists
More generally, there has been inadequate delegation of authority from ANDMA – DMC has
no control over its budget or human resource functions, and has never even been issued a
stamp, which means it cannot officially communicate directly in writing with other
government agencies (i.e. written communication must go to ANDMA for signature and to
be stamped as an official written communication)
ANDMA’s failure to delegate specific authority for DMC to issue accreditation to operators
Low initial levels of education and training of the DMC staff
Salaries and benefits for civil servants are inadequate to attract and retain well‐qualified
personnel, given the presence of UN agencies, embassies, international consulting
companies and NGOs

The most fundamental issue has been the lack of interest from the Government of Afghanistan in
serious discussions for a transitions plan, or in taking steps to enhance the mandate and authority of
DMC, without which little sustained progress to transition would be possible.

Transition of MRE and Victim Assistance
Work on the transition of Victim Assistance and MRE had begun even earlier. MACCA supported
efforts by government ministries and the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) to strengthen their
capacities to assume responsibility for MRE and for services to persons with disabilities. These
efforts started to bear fruit by 2006 and MACCA proposed a programme to develop a national Plan
of Action via an inter‐ministerial task force for disability.40 In 2007, MACCA signed MoUs with three
ministries as well as the ARCS and ICRC to ensure the progress continued.41 In 2008, MACCA created
a Transitions Unit to manage its partnerships with the ministries and the ARCS.
Textbox 1 – MACCA Transitions Unit
In 2008, MACCA established a transition unit under the Director’s office to manage the transition to
national responsibility for the MRE and VA components. To facilitate this, it signed three‐year
memoranda of understanding (MoU) with:
 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)
 Ministry of Education (MoE)
 Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
 Afghanistan Red Crescent Society (ARCS)
During the transition, the UNMAS agreed to fund an advisor in each of the ministries to assist with policy
development and capacity enhancement. This aimed at the mainstreaming of MRE and Disability into
ministry policies and programmes.
Mine Risk Education
For its part, the MoE made MRE and Inclusive Education cross‐cutting issues in its new curriculum (along
with gender, narcotics, corruption, and the environment). New textbooks incorporating MRE and

40

MACCA, Transition Plan for Victim Assistance Activities and Mine Risk Education: Inter‐ministerial Task Force
for Disability Awareness, Advocacy and Prevention, Nov 2006.
41
In 2008, the GICHD officer responsible for assisting countries in developing strategies for disability
programmes (including assistance for landmine victims) reported that Afghanistan was one of the two ‘stars’
among the 24 countries she had surveyed or assisted.
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Inclusive Education messages were issued in 2008 and MoE regularly issues its quarterly magazine
(Tarbeyat) with MRE and Inclusive Education messages to reach school children.42 MACCA has trained and
the UN has supported 120 Child Protection Officers who, in turn, have trained 21,000 teachers.43
MACCA also worked with ARCS since 2006 to attempt a phase‐out of ‘direct delivery’ MRE. In 2007,
MACCA and ICRC signed a tripartite MoU with ARCS to support its capacity to assume responsibility for
residual risks. ARCS had already assumed responsibility in the North and North‐East, and MACCA planned
to stop support of direct delivery MRE in the East in 2009.
Victim Assistance
Disability is a major problem in Afghanistan – a survey conducted by Handicap International (HI) showed
that 2.7% of the population are severely disabled.44 Accordingly, the MoPH and MoLSAMD established
Disability Support Units (DSU). An Afghan consultant has been assigned by MACCA to both DSU, with
additional staff provided by the ministries. By 2008, both ministries were developing policies to ensure
people with disabilities could access their services.
As well, the MoE has included Inclusive Education in its new strategic plan and established an Inclusive
Education Department in its new organizational structure to coordinate the inclusive education activities
of MoE and its partners. The MACCA national advisor supports MoE/MACCA activities according to a joint
plan of action agreed by MoE and MACCA.
For example, by the end of 2008 MACCA had supported training in inclusive education (focusing on
enrolment of children with disabilities into general schools) for 400 school teachers of Kabul city and four
surrounding districts. This training continues and, to the end of 2011, about 1,200 teachers, 1,500
children with disabilities and their parents have received training. This has resulted in the enrolment of
over 350 children with disabilities into general schools.
The MACCA provides additional support to the ministries to enable representatives to attend regional
forums to share information and to network with other countries in the region.

An assessment conducted for CIDA in 2008 found that:
 MACCA’s partnership with MoE covered both MRE and disability issues provided for modest
assistance from MACCA for curriculum development, training and material to personnel in
the child protection unit allowing them to train 12,000 teachers on MRE, plus education and
training TV.
 with the MoPH, UNMAS provided modest financial assistance and paid for an Afghan
technical advisor who served as the Coordinator of the Disability Unit in the MoPH, in charge
of capacity development for:
 capacity development (e.g. curricula for training physiotherapist and orthopaedic
technicians; inclusion of disability topics in the training of Community Health Workers)
 meetings of the national disability taskforce
 with MoLSAMD, UNMAS paid for a local technical advisor who serves as the Coordinator of
the Disability Unit

42

MACCA continued activities targeting the estimated four million children who do not attend formal
education in Afghanistan.
43
The MoE will cover salaries of the Child Protection Officers from this year, but there are concerns that some
may leave because government salaries are lower.
44
As well, the 2003 National Risk & Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) found that about 14 per cent of rural
households have a disabled family member. The NRVA 2007‐08 found that over 10 per cent of households had
at least one severely disabled family member. Conflict and accidents are the leading causes of disability.
(Source: Ministry of Economy, Poverty Status in Afghanistan, World Bank, July 2010.)
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in all cases, the cooperation seemed to be fruitful and progress was being made (although
starting from a low base)45

Conversely, an evaluation conducted a few months later for the EC warned that “…the team is
concerned that some of the MACCA’s apparent success in transitioning elements of the programme,
such as MRE to line ministries may appear as developmentally correct, but may not deliver tangible
benefits where it is most needed, in mine affected communities.”46 The Report pointed to the
deterioration in victim data gathering by ARCS in 2008, following the reduction of support for this
activity by ICRC. The evaluation team was concerned that MACCA was reducing its responsibility
towards MRE and Victim Assistance, and recommended instead that MACCA increased its
involvement with, for example, vocational training programmes for landmine victims rather than
restricting itself to supporting policy and capacity development.
The UN continues assistance through MACCA (the Transitions Unit is now called the Disability
Support Unit) and progress has continued in building capacities in MoLSAMD, MoPH, and MoE. Each
ministry has incorporated disability assistance policies and activities within its strategic plan, and all
three ministries have established units dedicated to disability programming, as follows:
 in 2008, MoLSAMD appointed a new Deputy Minister for Martyrs and Disability Affairs plus a
Disability Directorate
 in 2009, MoPH created a Disability and Rehabilitation Department, which now has 11
personnel
 in 2009, MoE established an Inclusive Education Department
Further details on milestones achieved in Victim/disability assistance are provided in Annex 3

MACCA and UNMAS
The Government has not been alone in its lack of engagement in the development of and
commitment to a transition plan; MACCA has not received a clear endorsement from UNMAS
headquarters in New York. By early 2010, MACCA had drafted a Road Map47 to transition. The
document was based on principles stated in the Afghan Compact (state building and capacity
development), strategic goals in the current UN Mine Action Strategy (development of national
institutions and capacities to address the residual threat) and the goals and indicators of success for
transition contained in The Way Ahead (the National Mine Action Strategy endorsed by the
government). Implementation was to be ‘event driven’ rather than according to a timeline (i.e.
moving forward once defined milestones are achieved, as opposed to setting a schedule for when
each milestone should be achieved).
The document went through numerous revisions, turning into a draft “UNMAS Concept Paper for
Transition” by June 2010. However, UNMAS headquarters never endorsed it as a basis for discussion
with the Government. At the same time, UNMAS HQ did not express any fundamental opposition to
the Plan so MACCA continued with implementation, securing approval for specific steps forward via
the annual operations planning and budgeting process. However, the lack of official endorsement of
the Transition Plan by UNMAS curtailed, somewhat, MACCA’s ability to press ANDMA and the
Government to focus on their part of the transition process.48

45

Paterson et al, Assessment of UNMACA, GICHD, Geneva, August 2008
Paul Davies and Bruce Todd, Mid Term Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan, p. 41.
47
The document uses the definition of a road map as a plan to a final outcome, which also defines the process,
required outcomes and indicators of success along the way.
48
International mine action donors and the States Parties to the APMBC have also remained reticent to engage
the GoA on the question of transition. This probably reflects the general belief that the Afghan mine action
46
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The Road Map explained the split in the UNMAS Afghan operations into three separate project
offices:
 the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) handling the functions that
would eventually be transferred to the DMC
o Mine Action operations planning and coordination
o Delivery of operational support
o Quality Management
o Information Management
 the UNMAS Office in Afghanistan covers broader UNMAS responsibilities (e.g. within the UN
system; resource mobilisation and donor relations)
 the Mine Action Support Services Office houses the financial and administrative services
provided by UNOPS and includes MACOA – Mine Action Contracts Office, Afghanistan –
which handles contract management for funding provided by donors via the UN
This reorganisation set the stage for transition by removing functions that would not be transferred
to GoA into two distinct projects.
The various draft transition documents prepared by MACCA also took pains to highlight that the
transition process would be protracted and the role of DMC and an eventual national mine action
authority would expand gradually. For instance, the diagram below lays out four stages, with the
following milestones:
1. Meeting the Afghan Compact goals (reduce hazard by 70%) – 2011
2. Achieving ‘impact free’ status – 2013 (Afghanistan’s initial deadline for Article 5 compliance)
3. Achieving Article 5 compliance (clearing all known mined areas) – 2018
4. Full national responsibility for dealing with the residual contamination – after 2018
Figure 7 – Depiction of evolving roles during the transition process

Phase 4 the long
term residual
hazard, 60 years
plus

Time

Hazard
remaining

LOW

Final National Entity

Phase 3 Residual
unknowns or
Ottawa Goals
delayed 2015-2018

Zone of high cost
and difficulty

Removal of all
know hazard

DMC
MACA

Phase 2 Ottawa
Goals 2013 or
Compact Goals
delayed

Reduced to
impact free

MACA

DMC
Reduced by 70%

Phase 1 Meeting
the Compact Goals
2011

MACA

DMC
HIGH

MACA
Start point
2010

DMC

Starting point
600 sq km

programme was working well coupled with the fear that the GoA would be unable to oversee and coordinate
the programme effectively.
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CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS49
MAPA
The MAPA remains a large programme, with 44 implementing partners employing over 12,500
people. The recent Article 5 Extension Request foresees a decline in the size of the demining
programme averaging about 10% per year over the next decade.
Table 5 – Overview of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) today
Level
Organisations
 Government of Afghanistan – Department for Mince Clearance
Strategy, Policy & Coordination
 UN support – MACCA
Coordination and QA/QC for an area
 7 Area Mine Action Centres
‘Humanitarian’ mine action
 16 operators
implementation
Commercial demining (mostly site
 28 national and international commercial operators
safety verification)
Figure 8 – Projections of costs and number of teams for MAPA
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DMC and ANDMA
MACCA continues to involve DMC in planning and general coordination of the MAPA. DMC also
conducts an annual audit of demining tasks and is active in facilitation of mine action activities that
involve government processes, including:
 Processing the importation of demining equipment
 Facilitating the transportation of explosives
 Endorsing mine action agency reports for donors and the Ministry of Economy
 Reporting on Afghanistan’s treaties and obligations
 Reporting the programme’s progress to the Presidential Office;
 Identifying the GoA’s priorities for the mine action annual national work plan to meet the
requirements of Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)
 Initiating the accreditation process for new demining organisations
49

This section is based largely on Chapter 5 of Afghanistan’s Article 5 Extension Request.
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Organizing and chairing demining coordination meetings with the GoA
Facilitating the outreach process to the GoA and Parliament

In brief, DMC is still accompanying MACCA rather than playing a central role in setting the strategic
direction of MAPA, planning and coordinating operations, or assessing results. It remains weak in
terms of human and financial resources, as does its parent, ANDMA.50

MACCA and AMACs
The MACCA in Kabul employs about 150 people. It is responsible for:
 Managing the national mine action database
 Coordination of survey, clearance and EOD response
 Coordination of MRE
 Support to the GoA for Victim Assistance and disability programming, through advisors in
MoLSAMD, MoPH and MoE
 Quality Management, Monitoring & Evaluation
 Outreach and information sharing with government departments and agencies, donors,
development agencies, and security sector organisations, plus regional and international
mine action organisations
At the start of 1391 (1 April 2012), MACCA removed the remaining international personnel from
direct management roles: the remaining international staff serve in the UN Project Office as advisors
to both MACCA and UNMAS. They remain collocated with MACCA and DMC.
In addition, there remain seven Area Mine Action Centres responsible for coordination in seven
regions of the country.
Figure 9 – Area Mine Action Centres

50

See, for example, Sudha Gooty, Rapid Capacity Assessment and Proposed Actions: Afghanistan National
Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), July 2011.
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Possible Future Evolution
The Director of DMC has recently retired. An option is for one of the current managers in MACCA to
assume the post of Director of DMC. This would put DMC under an experienced mine action
manager who is well versed in how the international mine action community functions. Such a
solution, should it come to pass, would provide for an advocate, inside the government apparatus,
who could make the case for Afghanistan to assume greater responsibility over time, and to invest in
its own capacities to assume such responsibility.
Over the next two years, the UN plans to close the MACCA compound and the AMAC offices, moving
all the staff into a DMC compound in Kabul and into ANDMA or other government offices in the
region. Once this occurs, the remaining international advisors will move to UNMAS offices and will
no longer be collocated with the MACCA and DMC.
The UN envisages a gradual reduction in the UN Project Office and in its financial support to
coordination (i.e. the MACCA and DMC). UN support to coordination is projected to end in 2017.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan has a long and complex history. During its first decade,
the ‘Afghan Model’ featured a small group of internationals, based in Pakistan, who coordinated a
large and growing programme implemented largely by Afghan mine action NGOs. This gave ample
opportunity for talented Afghans to develop managerial and specialist skills. As well, Afghan NGOs
were in charge of many of the functions usually associated with a mine action centre, including
database management and QA/QC. It was a UN‐programme, but largely nationalised.
This changed in the immediate post‐Taliban era. UNMAS assumed responsibility for the MACCA,
which was relocated to Kabul. UNMAS greatly expanded the number of international positions and
absorbed some of the traditional mine action centre functions, which reduced the opportunities for
Afghans to display their managerial and leadership roles within MACCA. This de‐nationalisation of
management continued in spite of a UNDP project intended to initiate a transitions process in 2004‐
05. With respect to overall coordination and demining (where most of the money is spent), UNMAS
instituted a reversal of this de‐nationalisation process, starting in mid‐2007 with the appointment of
Dr Reza as MACCA Director. Five years later, the MACCA is staffed entirely by Afghans, with a few
remaining international personnel serving as advisors housed in a UN Project Office.
At about the same time, MACCA also initiated far closer cooperation with the Department for Mine
Clearance – the government focal point for mine action. This started with collocation followed by
significant assistance from MACCA to develop and begin implementing a capacity development plan
for DMC. MACCA also published what it described as a joint MACCA/DMC transition plan, albeit one
in which MACCA was overwhelmingly the dominant partner.
However, neither the Government of Afghanistan as a whole or ANDMA have shown interest in
assuming greater responsibility for the mine action programme. The government failed to adopt
legislation or a decree to establish an adequate structure for a national mine action programme. It
has made little effort to inject funds and hire qualified personnel into national mine action
structures to create a foundation on which capacities could be built. It has failed to initiate
discussions with mine action donors and UNMAS on transition.
For its part, unsurprisingly, the international community has not demonstrated unity of purpose in
terms of transition. Neither donors nor the States Parties to the APMBC have pressed the Afghan
government on its failure to show interest in assuming greater responsibility for mine action. As
well, until the Article 5 Extension Request was drafted in early 2012, MACCA never succeeded in
getting a clear endorsement from UNMAS for a UN transition strategy, which might have provided a
basis for more focussed and purposeful discussions with the GoA. As a result, only very modest
progress has been made in equipping DMC with the capacity to plan and coordinate the MAPA. DMC
remains the child of – rather than partner to – MACCA, providing a veneer of government
engagement but no substantive contribution.
A plan to accelerate transition is sketched‐out in the draft Article 5 Extension Request (prepared
almost exclusively by MACCA on behalf of the GoA). This is based not on building the capacity of the
current DMC personnel, but on the eventual absorption of skilled MACCA personnel into the public
service or on the legal establishment of a semi‐autonomous agency as envisaged in the draft
legislation finalised in 2006, which subsequently died without being submitted to Parliament.
However, the Extension Request makes clear that this proposal represents ‘a model for dialogue; it is
not a blueprint for change.’
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Regardless, transition does figure centrally in the Article 5 Extension Request, signifying that (in the
eyes of the outgoing MACCA management team) it is time for more concerted discussions between
the international community and the Afghan government to reach a consensus on the way forward.
In the continuing absence of a champion for transition within the government, whether progress
happens probably depends on the delivery of clear and consistent messages by UNMAS, key donors,
and the APMBC States Parties organs51 that transition is not a distant option but, rather, a process
that must begin today. Unfortunately, there seems no guarantee that the international community
will find the necessary unity of purpose to rouse the Afghan government from its lethargy.
Afghanistan’s mine action programme is a stark example of the lack of unanimity within the
international mine action community concerning transition, particularly in fragile and conflict‐
affected states. Given the great capability of Afghan mine action managers, plus the openness of the
post‐2007 cadre of senior international personnel in MACCA to transition, this is a squandered
opportunity. Concerted engagement at senior management and political levels would have allowed
the crafting of an agreement for truly national mine action organs that would have had sufficient
oversight and insulation from the corrosive Afghan political process to perform well and set an
example of what Afghans can achieve with proper financial support. What could have been a
national treasure is still but a work in progress, and the transition to national responsibility will only
happen once the programme is vastly diminished.
On the other hand, many would argue that the present situation represents a triumph of common
sense over political correctness. The MAPA remains a capable and productive programme that
enhances the wellbeing of people in mine‐affected communities. It remains under UNMAS control.
The Afghan Government has not demonstrated the capacity to deliver public services effectively, so
greater control by the government would lead to a reduction in mine action services to the public.
Which view is correct may never be known with certainty. The MAPA depends overwhelmingly on
international funding. Some donors might reduce their support if the Afghan Government assumes
greater control because, in part, of corruption fears. However, how long will the donor community
continue to provide the kind of funding envisaged by the Article 5 Extension Request to a UN‐
managed programme, without a clear demonstration by the government of its responsibility?

51

These organs are the ‘troika’ of the past, current, and in‐coming States Parties’ presidents, plus the
Implementation Support Unit, as well as the States Parties collectively.
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Annex 1 – Timeline
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Annex 2 – Vision, End Goals and Indicators from The Way Ahead
Vision – A country free from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), where people and communities live in a safe environment conducive to national
development, and where landmine and ERW survivors are fully integrated in the society and thus have their rights and needs recognized and fulfilled.
Goal 1 Demining – The End Goal for demining will be achieved when
all known mine/ERW contaminated areas are cleared. There will
continue to be an effective mines/ERW demining capability to
respond to unknown residual risk and continuing public awareness of
how to recognize and report suspicious items for disposal by qualified
authorities. Mapping of cleared areas will be complete and accurate;
and this data will be made available as needed to the public and
designated institutions. All post‐clearance documentation will be
complete and all cleared land will have been handed over in
accordance with national standards.
Goal 2 Mine/ERW Risk Education (MRE) – The End Goal for MRE will
be achieved when a comprehensive and sustainable system is in place
to educate and raise awareness throughout people and communities
nationwide regarding the residual mines/ERW threats, including
sufficient information to recognize and report these items to the
appropriate authorities.
Goal 3 Stockpile Destruction – The End Goal for mine stockpile
destruction will be achieved when illegal, abandoned or otherwise
unwanted munitions have been destroyed or otherwise disposed of.
Goal 4 Mine/ERW Survivor Assistance – The End Goal for Mine/ERW
survivor assistance will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors are
reintegrated into Afghan society, with support provided through a
national system that incorporates the rights and needs of people with
disabilities.
Goal 5 Advocacy and Coordination – The End Goal for advocacy and
coordination will be achieved when relevant institutions and civil
society cooperate and support the fulfillment of Afghanistan
commitments to the eradication of mines/ERW, and the importance
of mine‐action for communities and national development.

Goal 1.1 All known mine/ERW contaminated areas are demined.
Goal 1.2 Following the demining of all known mine/ERW contaminated areas, a reporting and response
capacity to deal with unknown residual mine/ERW contamination is established and maintained.
Goal 1.3 All demining documentation is completed and recorded in a data system.
This database is maintained and made available to all concerned.
Goal 1.4 Demining coordination functions maintained and linked with the other mine‐action
pillars/programmes.

Goal 2.1 Pro‐active MRE activities undertaken until there are no known remaining mine/ERW contaminated
areas in Afghanistan.
Goal 2.2 Capacity for public awareness of the residual mine/ERW threat to life and limb is maintained.
Goal 2.3 MRE coordination functions maintained and linked with the other mine action pillars/programmes.

Goal 3.1 All stockpiled anti‐personnel mines are destroyed as per international treaty commitments.
Goal 3.2 All abandoned or otherwise unwanted mines (other than anti‐personnel mines) are disposed of.
Goal 3.3 Stockpile destruction coordination functions maintained and linked with the other mine‐action
pillars/programmes.
Goal 4.1 Mine/ERW survivor assistance functions are embedded in national entities and programmes that
are responsible for social welfare, health, education and employment.
Goal 4.2 Mine/ERW survivor assistance coordination functions maintained and linked with the other mine‐
action pillars/programmes and with the broader disability assistance coordination function.
Goal 5.1 Domestic laws related to Afghanistan’s commitments under international legal instruments
related to mines/ERW are adhered to.
Goal 5.2 Afghan establishment and community leaders support mine‐action.
Goal 5.3 Information concerning geographical, cadastral surveys as well as social and economic researches
is centrally and methodically reported and made available to all, should they be GoA, NGOs, commercial
companies or other organization.
Goal 5.4 Advocacy coordination functions maintained and linked with the other mine‐action
pillars/programmes.
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Annex 3 – Outputs and Achievements in the Transition Plan
Outputs Planned for 1388
Transition plan developed by
UN/DMC

Achievements in 1388

Comments Report for 1388
*UN and IMB transition plans
(to be published in March 2010)
*in 1389 UNMAS and IMB will
publish a transition timeline.

Transition plan developed by
IMB
Capacity Development plan
developed by DMC
Accreditation transitioned

…made progress in 1388

Custody and maintenance of
AMAS transitioned

80% of the AMAS were
translated into local languages.

Capacity and skills assessment
of DMC staff to be carried out
by 3rd party in 1389
DMC participated in accredita‐
tion of 9 demining companies
The approval of AMAS by GoA is
now in progress

Mine Action Law enacted (not mentioned in 1388)
Quality Assurance plans
prepared by DMC

Support to coordination for
MRE transferred

Land cleared/cancelled audited
by DMC

* DMC conducted 80 QA and
monitoring visits of demining.
* DMC represented on Boards
of Inquiry for two demining
accidents
DMC and MACCA have formed
a joint MRE department. DMC
leads inter‐ministerial outreach
activities with technical support
fostered by the MACCA

Achievements in 1389
Transition roadmap developed
by MACCA for discussion with
UNMAS

Plan 1390
An agreed Government/UNMAS
document (MoU?) will be
created

Capacity Development needs
assessment and 4‐year plan
developed for DMC

DMC staff attended courses in
IT, English Evaluating Mine
Action Workshop

1st meeting with Afghanistan
National Standards Agency
(ANSA) – agreed to submit
AMAS for potential adoption
Agreed with Justice Ministry to
start with decree, then law
decree drafted; still needs
approval and dissemination

A review of government
requirements for QA is planned
for 1389

*DMC and MoE have a strong
working relationship…
*DMC actively involved in MRE
Training of Trainer workshops
and MRE monitoring
Audit of cleared and cancelled
land – 177 field visits plus 20%
desk audit
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Outputs Planned for 1388
Inter‐ministerial board chaired
by DMC
Article 7 Report prepared and
submitted to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by DMC

Contracting entity established
within DMC

Achievements in 1388
DMC chairs the Inter‐ministerial
Board (IMB) with minimal
support from MACCA
DMC prepared and finalized the
Mine Ban Treaty’s Article 7
report on behalf of the MoFA,
with the technical support of
the MACCA

Comments Report for 1388

Achievements in 1389

Plan 1390

It is hoped that in 1389, with
sufficient capacity
development, DMC will be able
to prepare this with minimal
support from MACCA
Investigations into GoA
processes in terms of how a
mine action contracting facility
would be handled are ongoing
and it is hoped that this will be
concluded in 1389

With MACCA technical support,
DMC prepared and finalized the
Mine Ban Treaty’s Article 7
report on behalf of MoFA

It is hoped that in 1390, with
sufficient capacity
development, DMC will be able
to prepare this with minimal
support from MACCA.
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